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CONSISTENT INCONSISTENCY: CERCLA PRIVATE
COST RECOVERY ACTIONS AND THE COMMUNITY
RELATIONS "REQUIREMENT"
Shelley J. Pellegrino
Abstract. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) provides private parties with the right to recover their cleanup costs from third
parties responsible for contaminating sites with hazardous waste. To do so, plaintiffs must
show that their response costs are consistent with the National Contingency Plan (NCP),
which establishes procedures and standards for hazardous waste cleanup. Courts presently
diverge regarding the NCP community relations requirement. Some courts find that private
parties satisfy these public participation provisions by working with a government agency.
Other courts bold that private parties cannot recover their cleanup costs without providing the
public with an opportunity to comment. This Comment examines CERCLA and the NCP
community relations requirement, and argues that courts must recognize that public
participation, which involves highly localized and distinct community concerns, is crucial to
the attainment of a CERCLA-quality cleanup. Therefore, private parties must provide an
opportunity for public participation to recover their cleanup costs under the NCP.
Congress adopted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)' to address the dangers to
human health and the environment caused by hazardous substances. A
significant feature of the statutory scheme is that it creates a private
cause of action, allowing private parties to recover the costs of cleanup
from other parties responsible for the contamination.2 One of the
requirements for recovery is that the plaintiff prove that its cleanup
actions were consistent with the National Contingency Plan (NCP),3 a set
of criteria outlining the procedures and standards for responding to
hazardous waste releases.
The NCP contains a community relations provision, which requires
private parties undertaking cleanup actions to provide an opportunity for
public comment.4 Courts are divided as to the level and type of public
participation necessary to demonstrate consistency with the NCP. Some
courts find that as long as the cleanup is of CERCLA quality, a private
party that did not provide an opportunity for public participation, but
1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1994 & Supp. 11995)).
2. CERCLA § 107,42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994).
3. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1996).
4. 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(cX6).
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worked with a government agency, can recover its cleanup costs.' Other
courts consider the lack of public participation a bar to recovery.6
This Comment argues that courts lack a true understanding of public
participation-an inclusive process encompassing a diversity of interests
and experiences. Equally important, private party hazardous waste
cleanup is a highly localized endeavor; those directly affected by both
the contamination and the cleanup plan should be provided with the
opportunity to be involved in decisions regarding their health and
environment. Accordingly, because an agency cannot adequately
represent the multifarious interests within a particular community, courts
should not permit government involvement to substitute: for meaningful
public participation. The community relations requirement should be
considered a fundamental component of a CERCLA-quality cleanup,
thereby making it necessary for private parties to provide an opportunity
for public participation to recover their cleanup costs under the NCP.
Part I provides a brief overview of CERCLA, and Part II examines the
NCP and the specifics of the community relations requirement. Part III
underscores the split in judicial interpretations of the community
relations requirement, including various policy considerations underlying
the two approaches. Part IV contends that courts have failed to
understand the nature and importance of public participation, and argues
that government involvement should not serve as a substitute for public
comment. Finally, this Comment concludes that meaningful public
participation is a necessary component of a CERCLA-quality cleanup.
I. CERCLA
A. Overview
It is now well established that Congress passed CERCLA in haste.'
Spawned by Love Canal,' the public outcry over improper hazardous
waste disposal and the concomitant demand for cleaning up hazardous
5. See discussion infra Part HI.A.
6. See discussion infra Part EI.B.
7. See, e.g., Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1988)
(calling CERCLA "hastily conceived and briefly debated piece of legislation")
8. The Love Canal incident involved the improper burial of approximately 80,000 tons of
hazardous waste beneath an elementary school and residential subdivision in Niagara Falls, New
York. The discovery of thousands of other dumpsites followed. S. Rep. No. 96.848, at 8-10 (1980).
936
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waste sites compelled Congress to come up with an immediate response.9
That response took the form of CERCLA, a compromise measure passed
in the waning hours of the 96th Congress." As a result of its quick
passage, CERCLA is vague, ambiguous, and virtually devoid of
legislative history, leaving courts to fill in the gaps."
Nevertheless, CERCLA's broad objectives are laudable. They include
facilitating the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites, providing a
mechanism for financing both governmental and private responses, and
placing the ultimate financial burden for a cleanup on those responsible
for creating the danger.'2 Congress created the Superfund, a trust fund
used to finance government cleanup activities, whereby the government
cleans up hazardous waste sites first and recovers its cleanup costs later. 3
The Superfund allows the government to defer the complicated and time-
consuming process of determining who is responsible for the
contamination and how cleanup costs should be allocated. Cleanups can
occur quickly, and the entities that created the environmental problem
ultimately bear the financial responsibility for replenishing the Superfund
coffers. 4
9. See Rhodes v. County of Darlington, 833 F. Supp. 1163, 1172-75 (D.S.C. 1992) (discussing
CERCLA's legislative history).
10. Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability ("Superfund") Act of1980, 8 Colum. i. Envtl. L. 1, 1 (1982).
[Pub. L. 96-510] was considered on December 3, 1980, in the closing days of the lame duck
session of an outgoing Congress. It was considered and passed, after very limited debate, under
a suspension of the rules, in a situation which allowed for no amendments. Faced with a
complicated bill on a take it-or-leave it basis, the House took it, groaning all the way.
Il
11. Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 350 (D.N.J. 1991) ("CERCLA's
legislative history reveals that Congress intended that the courts should develop federal common law
to fill in the gaps in the statute."); see also William H. Rodgers, Jr., Environmental Law § 8.1, at 683
(2d ed. 1994) ("Alone among the environmental laws CERCLA relies upon the 'common law' to fill
in crucial details and this invitation has been exercised by the courts with a vengeance in pursuit of
the cleanup beacon.... [A] torrent of judicial decisions... has made Superfund the legal equivalent
of a termite colony .... ").
12. City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142-43 (E.D. Pa. 1982); see
also Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1992)
("Congress intended to provide the federal government with the means to effectively control the
spread of hazardous materials... [and] intended to affix the ultimate cost of cleaning up... to the
parties responsible for the contamination.'); Wickland Oil Terminals v. ASARCO, Inc., 792 F.2d
887, 890 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that dual public/private enforcement mechanism "provide[s] a
comprehensive response to the problem of hazardous substance release").
13. S. Rep. No. 96-848, at 12.
14. In truth, however, fiind replenishment is largely an illusion. Only $1 billion of the $10.1
billion expended through fiscal year 1994 had been recovered by the United States in cost recovery
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Government cleanups under the Superfund are lengthy and costly
undertakings, however, averaging more than ten years 5 and twenty-six
million dollars 6 to complete. Thus, many private property owners find it
necessary to clean up the contamination themselves, lest they be unable
to use their property as collateral to obtain loans, sell or lease their
property, or obtain government permits to develop their land. 17
To encourage private parties to undertake cleanup actions and thereby
effectuate its goal of cleaning up hazardous waste sites quickly, Congress
expressly created a private right of action for cost recovery under
CERCLA section 107.18 Under this provision, private parties initiate
cleanup actions themselves and then attempt to recover their costs
through the judicial process.
B. Private Cost Recovery Actions Under Section 107
CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B) provides that any person who has
responded to a release or threatened release of a hazardots substance at a
facility may recover necessary response costs from a potentially
responsible party (PRP).'9 Although CERCLA does not specifically
delineate the elements of a prima facie claim for a section 107 cost
recovery action, courts generally agree that a plaintiff must show the
following: (1) the defendant falls within one of four categories of PRPs;
(2) the site at issue is a "facility" as defined by CERCLA; (3) a release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance from the facility occurred;
(4) the release or threatened release caused the plaintiff to incur response
costs; and (5) the response costs were necessary and consistent with the
actions. General Accounting Office, Superfund: System Enhancements Could Lnprove the Efficiency
of Cost Recovery I (GAO-AIMD-95-177 1995).
15. General Accounting Office, Superfund: Tunes to Assess and Clean Up Hazardous Waste Sites
Exceed Program Goals 5 (GAO/T-RCED-97-69 1997) (explaining that sites cle ned up in 1996 took
average of 10.6 years to complete).
16. General Accounting Office, Superfund: Implications of Key Reauhorization Issues 3
(GAO/T-RCED-96-145 1996).
17. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. et al., Cost Recovery by Private Parties Under CERCLA: Planning a
Response Action for Maximum Recovery, 27 Tulsa LJ. 365, 384 (1992).
18. CERCLA § 107,42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994).
19. See CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B). PRPs fall into four categories:
(1) present owners or operators of a facility; (2) past owners or operators of a facility at the time of
disposal; (3) generators who, in any way, arranged to dispose of the hazardous waste; and
(4) hazardous waste transporters. CERCLA § 107(a)(l)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4).
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National Contingency Plan.2" Prior government approval of the cleanup
plan is not a prerequisite to a section 107 private right of action.2'
Subject to three limited defenses,' liability is strict for those
responsible for the contamination.' Courts have also held that CERCLA
imposes joint and several liability on all responsible parties.24 Liable
parties can then sue other PRPs for contribution to the response costs
under section 113.'
Response costs are not defined in CERCLA, although "respond" or
"response" is defined as "remove, removal, remedy, and remedial
action."26 Private parties undertake removal actions in response to an
imminent threat to the public health or welfare of the environment.27
20. See, e.g., Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1150 (1st Cir.
1989); Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1989). Note that a split
of authority exists with respect to the point at which a plaintiff must demonstrate that its response
costs were consistent with the NCP. Most courts indicate that the consistency requirement is part of a
prima facie case establishing liability. See, e.g., Cose v. Getty Oil Co., 4 F.3d 700,
703-04 (9th Cir. 1993); County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1512 (10th Cir. 1991);
Dedham Water, 889 F.2d at 1150. Other courts, however, assert that consistency goes only to the
amount of recoverable damages. See, ag., Washington Dep't of Transp. v. Washington Natural Gas
Co., 59 F.3d 793, 798 (9th Cir. 1995) (arguing that failure to comply with NCP is not defense to
liability, but instead factual issue affecting damages); Cadillac Fairview/Califomia, Inc. v. Dow
Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1988); GJ. Leasing Co. v. Union Elec. Co., 825 F. Supp.
1363, 1379 (S.D. Ill. 1993), aff'd, 54 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 1995); Mid Valley Bank v. North Valley
Bank, 764 F. Supp. 1377, 1389 (E.D. Cal. 1991).
21. Cadillac Fairview, 840 F.2d at 694 ("[Nothing in the plain language of section
107(a) ... indicates that a party seeking to recover its costs of response must await approval of or
action by a state or local governmental entity."); see also Richland-Lexington Airport Dist. v. Atlas
Properties, Inc., 901 F.2d 1206, 1208-09 (4th Cir. 1990); Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-
Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1575 (5th Cir. 1988).
22. Defendants must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat of
release of the hazardous substance and resulting damages were caused solely by an act of God, act of
war, or act or omission of a third party. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). In general, the first
two defenses almost never prevail. For a third party defense to succeed, the defendant usually must
demonstrate that the third party is completely unconnected to the defendant (e.g., a "midnight
dumper"). See generally Rodgers, supra note 11, § 8.8, at 796-98 (discussing § 107(b) defenses).
23. See, e.g., Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 799 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir.
1986); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985).
24. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 811 (S.D. Ohio 1983). When Congress
amended CERCLA in 1986, its legislative history supported the Chem-Dyne ruling. See H.R. Rep.
No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 74 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2856 ("[Nothing in this bill is
intended to change the application of the uniform federal rule ofjoint and several liability enunciated
by the Chem-Dyne court.").
25. CERCLA § 113(f(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f(1) (1994), states that "any person may seek
contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this
title, during or following any civil action under [section 9606 or section 9607(a)]."
26. CERCLA § 101(25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1994).
27. CERCLA § 101(23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23).
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Removal actions are thus short-term in nature and includ,- such measures
as erecting security fencing, providing alternative water supplies, or
providing temporary evacuation and housing.2" In contrast, remedial
actions represent a more permanent solution and may take several years
to complete.29 Illustrative remedial actions include cleardng up released
hazardous substances and contaminated materials, repairing leaking
containers, and destroying reactive wastes.3"
Because CERCLA provides only limited guidance, courts determine
recoverable response costs associated with removal and remedial
measures on a case-by-case basis.3' At a minimum, private party
plaintiffs who make a prima facie showing are entitled to recover their
actual cleanup costs. 32 Preliminary costs such as investigating and
evaluating the hazardous substances present at a site art, generally also
recoverable.33
II. CONSISTENCY WITH THE NATIONAL CONTINGENCY
PLAN
Most response costs are not recoverable unless a private party can
clear the principal hurdle in section 107 cost recovery actions:
demonstrating consistency with the National Contingency Plan (NCP).
34
Accomplishing this feat has proven to be a stumbling black for plaintiffs
28. CERCLA § 101(23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23).
29. CERCLA § 101(24),42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). The difference between removal and remedial
actions is well documented. See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 259
n.10 (3d Cir. 1992); VME Americas, Inc. v. Hein-Werner Corp., 946 F. Supp. 683, 689-90 (E.D.
Wis. 1996); Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc. 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1240 (M.D. Pa. 1991); Amland Properties
Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784,795 (D.N.L 1989).
30. CERCLA § 101(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24).
31. See 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8794 (1990).
32. See 1 Allan J. Topol & Rebecca Snow, SuperundLaw and Procedure § 6.3, at 606 (1992).
33. Courts now routinely award response costs for preliminary investigatve measures without
requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate consistency with the National Contingency Plan, normally an
element of a prima facie case. See, e.g., Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County,
851 F.2d 643, 651 (3d Cir. 1988); Wickland Oil Terminals v. ASARCO, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 892
(9th Cir. 1986); Marriott Corp. v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 825 F. Supp. 1575, 1581 (S.D. Fla. 1993);
Amland, 711 F. Supp. at 795.
34. See, e.g., Washington Dep't of Transp. v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 59 F.3d 793, 799
(9th Cir. 1995) ("[A]ny 'other person' seeking response costs under § 9607(a)(4)(B) must prove that
its actions are consistent with the NCP'); County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1512
(10th Cir. 1991); Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc. v. JFD Elecs. Corp., 748 F. Supp. 373, 381
(E.D.N.C. 1990); see also Topol & Snow, supra note 32, at 583 ("Under the CERCLA
scheme,... the recovery of response costs is tied to the NCP standards and plaintiffs cannot recover
costs for anything outside of the bounds set by that plan.").
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time and again, as PRPs are quick to challenge a private party's
compliance with the NCP in an effort to reduce or eliminate their
financial responsibility for the cleanup. Once again, CERCLA provides
little guidance.a5 Consequently, issues concerning what constitutes
compliance with the NCP and when it should be demonstrated continue
to plague courts and private party litigants alike.
A. NCP Overview
The NCP delineates procedures and standards for hazardous waste
cleanups.36 It establishes criteria for discovering and evaluating
contaminated sites, guidelines on cost effectiveness, and criteria for
determining the appropriate extent of response actions, including
alternative remedial options.37 Since its initial promulgation under
CERCLA, the NCP has been significantly revised twice, most recently in
1990.38 Prior to 1990, courts disagreed over whether a private party
needed to demonstrate strict or substantial compliance with the NCP to
recover cleanup costs from PRPs.3 9
With the 1990 NCP, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
recognized the pitfalls of a mechanistic rule: "providing a list of rigid
requirements may serve to defeat cost recovery for meritorious cleanup
actions based on a mere technical failure by the private party that has
taken the response action."' Consistency with the NCP is now satisfied
if the private party response action, "when evaluated as a whole, is in
substantial compliance with the applicable requirements... and results
in a CERCLA-quality cleanup."' Actions will not be considered
35. See Channel Master, 748 F. Supp. at 382-83 ("The requirement that private cleanup
procedures be 'consistent' with the 'national contingency plan' is confusing because CERCLA does
not define the term 'consistent.") (quoting Paul W. Heiring, Note, Private Cost Recovery Actions
Under CERCLA, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 1135, 1142 (1985)).
36. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. pt 300
(1996).
37. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300; see also Pierson Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Pierson Township, 851
F. Supp. 850, 855-56 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (citing Channel Master, 748 F. Supp. at 382), aff'd, 89
F.3d 835, No. 94-1472, 1996 WL 338624 (6th Cir. June 18, 1996).
38. See 55 Fed. Reg. 8666 (1990). The NCP was also amended in 1994, although the changes do
not affect the portions of the regulation discussed in this Comment. See 59 Fed. Reg. 47,384 (1994).
39. Compare Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784, 796-97
(D.N.J. 1989) (upholding strict compliance) with Wickland Oil Terminals v. ASARCO, Inc., 792
F.2d 887, 891 (9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting strict interpretation).
40. 55 Fed. Reg. at 8793.
41. 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(cX3)(i).
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inconsistent with the NCP "based on immaterial or insubstantial
deviations."42
Thus, the 1990 NCP is intended to serve more as a guide than a
checklist.43 The formerly mechanistic approach of crossing off completed
procedural requirements one-by-one has been supplanted by a balancing
approach. On one hand, a private party's response costs must be
measured against a standard based on the quality of a cleanup action.
Low-quality cleanups will not be tolerated.' On the other hand, the EPA
wants to remove unnecessary procedural obstacles to NC:P consistency to
encourage private parties to perform voluntary cleanups of contaminated
sites.4"
Nevertheless, demonstrating consistency with the NCP continues to be
a challenge for private parties undertaking section 107 cost recovery
actions. The NCP "community relations" requirement has proven to be
the latest obstacle, with courts differing as to what a private party
plaintiff must do to demonstrate consistency.46
B. NCP Community Relations Requirement
The NCP requires that private parties undertaking response actions
"provide an opportunity for public comment concerning the selection of
the response action" based on a set of potentially applicable provisions.47
In lieu of meeting these enumerated provisions, a private party may
provide an opportunity for public comment based on "substantially
equivalent state and local requirements." '48
Details of the provisions, termed "community relations" requirements,
are scattered throughout the NCP.49 They apply to both removal and
remedial actions,"0 and are intended to promote active communication
between affected communities and the party undertaking the response
42. 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(cX4).
43. 55 Fed. Reg. at 8793.
44. Id ("[The approach taken ... protects EPA's interest in ensuring that tte benefit of a right of
action under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B) should only be available for environmentally sound
cleanups .... ").
45. Id. at 8792-93.
46. See discussion infra Part IlL.
47. 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(6).
48. 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(6).
49. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.155, .415(n), .430(c), .430(f)(2)-(3), .430(f)(6), .435(c), .700(c)(6).
50. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (discussing removal and remedial actions).
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action." For removal actions, significant community relations provisions
include:
(1) designating a spokesperson to notify immediately-affected
citizens as well as state and local officials, to respond to
inquiries, and to inform the community of actions taken;52
(2) providing a public comment period of not less than 30 days,
and responding to significant comments (for actions with less
than six months before the removal begins);53 and
(3) conducting interviews with local officials, community
residents, or other interested parties, and "preparing a formal
community relations plan (CRP) based on the community
interviews" (for actions expected to extend beyond 120
days).
For remedial actions, which result in a permanent remedy and take
place over a longer period of time, community relations requirements are
more substantial. In addition to interviewing affected community
members and preparing a CRP,55 a party should:
(1) publish a brief analysis of the plan in a major local
newspaper;56
(2) provide the opportunity for a public meeting to be held at or
near the site at issue;57
(3) keep a transcript of the meeting, and prepare a written
summary of significant comments, criticisms, and relevant
new information;"
(4) discuss any significant changes in the proposed plan and seek
additional public input if new information becomes available
at a later date; 9 and
51. 40 C.F.R. § 300.155(c).
52. 40 C.F.1L § 300.415(nX1).
53. 40 C.F.R. § 300A15(nX2).
54. 40 C.F.R. § 300.415(n)(3).
55. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(c)(2Xii).
56. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(3)(i)(A).
57. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(3Xi)(D).
58. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(3XiXE)-(F).
59. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(t)(3Xii)(A)-(B).
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(5) make the record of decision available for public inspection.'
The purpose of the CRP is three-fold: (1) to ensure appropriate
opportunities for public involvement in a variety of site-related decisions,
including the selection of a remedy; (2) to determine the appropriate type
of activities to ensure public involvement; and (3) to provide appropriate
opportunities for a community to learn about a site.6
Despite the detailed set of community relations criteria, it remains
unclear whether public involvement is just another factor for courts to
weigh to determine NCP consistency or whether it is a strict requirement
such that noncompliance bars recovery. The EPA asserts that the NCP
community relations provisions define the minimum level of public
involvement necessary to ensure a CERCLA-quality cleanup:62
The public-both PRPs and concerned citizens-have a strong
interest in participating in cleanup decisions that may affect them,
and their involvement helps to ensure that these cleanups-which
are performed without governmental supervision-are carried out
in an environmentally sound manner. Thus, EPA has decided that
providing public participation opportunities should be: a condition
for cost recovery under CERCLA.63
At the same time, however, the EPA reiterates the importance of
maintaining a less rigid "substantial compliance" philosophy: "EPA does
not believe that the failure of a private party to provide a public hearing
should serve to defeat a cost recovery action if the public was afforded
an ample opportunity for comment."' Substantial compliance with a
twist? Courts are left once again to put their spin on an ambiguous
CERCLA concept.
Ill. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NCP
Although most courts agree that public participation is important,
judicial pronouncements have reflected divergent interpretations of what
actually constitutes the community relations requirement. Some courts
place strong emphasis on the concept of a CERCLA-quality cleanup and
are willing to accept government agency involvement in the cleanup
60. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(6)(ii).
61. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(c)(2)(ii)(A)-(C).
62. 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8766 (1990).
63. Id. at 8795.
64. Id. at 8793.
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process as a substitute for public participation. 5 They opine that state
agencies represent the public interest; accordingly, as long as a private
party attempts to work with an agency and attains an otherwise
successful cleanup, NCP compliance is fulfilled. Other courts are
unwilling to substitute government involvement for public comment.'
They stress the significance of the EPA's language about public
participation being a condition for cost recovery. Similarly, they argue
that citizen participation contributes to a better understanding of the
human health and environmental conditions of a particular cleanup site.
Therefore, to demonstrate NCP compliance and recover its cleanup costs,
a private party must have provided an opportunity for public
participation.
A. Substantial Compliance: Public Agency Involvement as a Substitute
for Public Comment
Several courts maintain that as long as a private party's cleanup action
includes "meaningful public participation," response cost recovery
should not be denied for a CERCLA-quality cleanup. 7 These courts
construe meaningful public participation broadly, noting that only "some
form" of a community relations plan is required and that the NCP
community relations requirements are only "potentially applicable" to
private party responses. 68  For removal actions, one court even
commented that it is permissible to wait until after the cleanup has
commenced before carrying out the community relations requirement.69
Courts that allow private parties to recover their response costs despite
evidence of little or no public comment reason that public agency
involvement in the cleanup is an adequate substitute for public comment.
General Electric Co. v. Litton Business Systems, Inc."° was the first case
to articulate this standard.7' The case involved a claim by General
65. See discussion infra Part Ill.A.
66. See discussion infra Part III.B.
67. See, e.g., Marriott Corp. v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 396, 403 (S.D. Fla. 1996);
American Color& Chem. Corp. v. Tenneco Polymers, Inc., 918 F. Supp. 945, 956 (D.S.C. 1995).
68. Hatco Corp. v. W.R- Grace & Co., 849 F. Supp. 931, 970 (D.N.J. 1994).
69. Greene v. Product Mfg. Corp., 842 F. Supp. 1321, 1326 (D. Kan. 1993).
70. 715 F. Supp. 949 (W.D. Mo. 1989), aff'd sub noma. General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus.
Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990).
71. Note that although General Electric interpreted the 1985 NCP, it followed the substantial
compliance standard. Id at 961. Courts continue to cite General Electric as the initial case standing
for the proposition that public agency involvement is enough to demonstrate consistency with the
NCP. See, e.g., American Color, 918 F. Supp. at 956; Hatco, 849 F. Supp. at 968.
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Electric against a former property owner to recover response costs for
removing cyanide-based residue from electroplating sludge dumped into
the soil.72 Prior to the cleanup, General Electric worked with the Missouri
Department of Natural Resources (MDNR).73  Site studies and
negotiations culminated in a consent decree setting; forth cleanup
requirements, including a provision that all actions be consistent with the
NCP.74 The MDNR continued to work with General Electric, approving
all response activities through completion of the cleanup.75
At no time, however, did General Electric conduct a public comment
period.76 Nevertheless, the district court found that the input General
Electric received from MDNR served as a substitute for public
comment.77 The court asserted, "[s]tatutes such as CERCLA which were
enacted for the protection and preservation of public health are to be
given an extremely liberal construction for the accomplishment of their
beneficial objectives."'78 General Electric thus recovered its cleanup
costs.
7 9
Amcast Industrial Corp. v. Detrex Corp.8" applied the General
Electric rationale to remedial actions. In Amcast, the plaintiffs sought to
recover response costs for cleaning up trichloroethylene (TCE), a solvent
made by DetrexY Amcast contended that Detrex spilled TCE when it
delivered the solvent to Amcast's site, thereby contaminating the soil and
groundwater. 3 As part of its remedial action, Amcast applied for a
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit." The
permit was to authorize the discharge of water that had been extracted
72. General Electric, 715 F. Supp. at 951.
73. Id. at 951-52.
74. Id. at 952.
75. Id. at 954.
76. Id at961.
77. Id.
78. Id (citing Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir.
1986)).
79. Id. at 963.
80. 779 F. Supp. 1519 (N.D. Ind. 1991), rev'd in part on other grounds, 2 F.3d 746 (7th Cir.
1993).
81. Id at 1538. As with General Electric, the Amcast opinion interpreted the 1985 NCP. Id at
1536. The court nevertheless opined that the result would be the same under either the strict or
substantial compliance standard. Id. at 1537.
82. Id at 1524.
83. Id
84. Id at 1537.
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and treated to remove the TCE contamination.85 Following a thirty-day
public comment period on Amcast's application, the Indiana Department
of Environmental Management (IDEM) decided not to hold a public
hearing because the comments received did not demonstrate a significant
public interest.8 6
Defendant Detrex argued that because the plaintiffs initiated the
remedial action before public notice of the NPDES permit was issued,
the public did not have any say in determining the remedy.87 The court
found otherwise. It determined that the plaintiffs satisfied the public
comment provision when they applied for the NPDES permit.8 Although
the permit application did not meet NCP requirements, the fact that
IDEM received public comment sufficed.89 More importantly, the court
extended the General Electric rationale-that complying with
appropriate state requirements and receiving state agency input can serve
as a substitute for public comment-to remedial actions: "[T]he
admonition of liberal construction of statutes such as CERCLA applies
with equal force to remedial actions under CERCLA."' The court thus
held that the plaintiffs complied with NCP public participation
requirements. 9'
Similarly, in Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.,92 a New Jersey district
court agreed that if a responding party notifies relevant regulatory
agencies, the absence of an opportunity for public comment will not
preclude cost recovery.93 Plaintiff Hatco undertook three removal
actions. In the first action, Hatco notified the EPA and the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection of the contamination and its
plan to undertake removal measures.' Notably, however, Hatco neither
considered nor knew of any relevant NCP criteria, nor did Hatco publish
any formal notice for public comment.95 The court, relying on the
General Electric analysis, nonetheless determined that the plaintiff
85. Id
86. Id
87. Id at 1537-38.
88. Id
89. d at 1537.
90. Id at 1538.
91. Id
92. 849 F. Supp. 931 (D.NJ. 1994).
93. Id at 968.
94. Id
95. Id at 947-48.
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substantially complied with the NCP.96 In the second and third removal
actions, Hatco did advise the public of the opportunity to comment, and
the court concluded that Hatco substantially complied with the 1990
NCP. 9
7
Likewise, American Color & Chemical Corp. v. Tenneco Polymers,
Inc.9" declared that the General Electric rationale also applied to the
1990 NCP. 99 In this case, American Color sought to recover response
costs for remediating polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) contamination. 0
At least nine governmental bodies or agencies, including the South
Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC), the
Beaufort County Council, the EPA, and the U.S. Any Corps of
Engineers were involved in the remediation.0 1 Various newspaper
articles covered the contamination and cleanup efforts. 2 A plant
manager at the site also spoke with approximately fifty residents about
remedial alternatives.0 3 At no time, however, did unerican Color
conduct a public hearing, nor did DHEC require one."° Nevertheless, the
district court held that American Color satisfied the conmunity relations
portion of the NCP based on substantial government involvement:
"[G]overnmental agencies charged with protection of the public interest
may serve as substitutes for participation by individual members of the
public."' 5 American Color recovered all of its response costs.'06
Courts from General Electric to American Color have focused on the
"potential applicability" of the public participation provisions rather than
on the specifics of a community relations requirement. Whether a
plaintiff designates a spokesperson to talk with affected citizens, prepares
a formal community relations plan, or even holds a public hearing is of
secondary importance. Instead, substantial compliance is often equated
96. Id. at 968. As in General Electric, the court evaluated Hatco's first removal action under the
1985 NCP based on a substantial compliance standard. Id. at 963-64.
97. Id. at 969.
98. 918 F. Supp. 945 (D.S.C. 1995).
99. Id. at 956.
100. Id. at 947.
101. Id. at 952.
102. Id. at 953.
103. Id. at 954.
104. Id at 957.
105. Id
106. Id at 958.
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with some form of state involvement in the cleanup process.' °7 With this
broad interpretation of meaningful public participation, courts hope to
effectuate the 1990 NCP's goal of not defeating a cost recovery action
based on a rigid set of requirements as long as a CERCLA-quality
cleanup is accomplished. 8
B. Public Comment Means Public Comment
In contrast, another line of authority adheres to a concept of public
participation that stresses citizen involvement. These courts assert that
the failure to provide an opportunity for public comment constitutes a
material and substantial departure from the NCP.'" Under this rule, even
a successful CERCLA-quality cleanup that includes some level of state
involvement is not enough to overcome a challenge based on the
community relations requirement."' As one court succinctly pronounced,
107. Other courts have come to similar conclusions. See, e.g., Marriott Corp. v. Simkins Indus.,
Inc., 929 F. Supp. 396, 404 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (finding that statutory requirement for public comment
was satisfied with newspaper advertisement for public hearing, notice to defendant of remediation
plan, and involvement of county agency); Greene v. Product Mfg. Corp., 842 F. Supp. 1321, 1326
(D. Kan. 1993) (noting that provisions of consent decree between plaintiffs and state agency satisfied
NCP requirements). The Ninth Circuit, although not commenting on state involvement, has held that
substantial compliance with the public meeting requirement was enough. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v.
ASARCO, Inc., 24 F.3d 1565, 1576 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Compliance here was not perfect, but it was
substantial.").
108. See supra text accompanying note 78; see also American Color, 918 F. Supp. at 955
("CERCLA was enacted 'to encourage... private cleanup efforts.... to preserve the limited
resources of the government and the Superfund, and to make those responsible bear the burden of the
conditions they created."') (quoting Con-Tech Sales Defined Benefit Trust v. Cockerham, Civ. A.
No. 87-5137, 1991 WL 209791, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 1991)).
109. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Hamtramck, 840 F. Supp. 470, 477 (E.D. Mich. 1993); see
also County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1514 (10th Cir. 1991); PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-
Williams Co., No. 93 C 1379, 1997 WL 223060, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 1997); VME Americas,
Inc. v. Hein-Werner Corp., 946 F. Supp. 683, 690 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v.
ACF Indus., Inc., 909 F. Supp. 1290, 1301-02 (E.D. Mo. 1995); G.L Leasing Co. v. Union Elec.
Co., 854 F. Supp. 539, 566 (S.D. Il. 1994), aff'd, 54 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 1995); Gussin Enters. v.
Rockola, No. 89 C 4742, 1993 WL 114643, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 1993).
110. See Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Indus., Inc., No. CIV.A. 94-0752, 1996 WL
557592, at *60 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 1996) (holding that communication with government agencies is not
substitute for public comment, and that contrary finding would vitiate public comment requirement);
Sherwin-Williams, 840 F. Supp. at 477 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (finding state regulatory involvement is
not substitute for public comment as contemplated by 1990 NCP); Channel Master Satellite Sys.,
Inc. v. JFD Elecs. Corp., 748 F. Supp. 373, 390 (E.D.N.C. 1990) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that
communication and cooperation with various government agencies satisfied public comment
requirement).
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"[p]ublic comment means just that, public comment.' Anything less
will not suffice.
In Channel Master Satellite Systems, Inc. v. .JFD Electronics Corp. , 2
the plaintiff brought a cost recovery action for remediation costs incurred
in cleaning two contaminated areas on its property."' Although state
environmental officials initially were not involved in considering cleanup
alternatives,14 they later assisted with the cleanup process. 5 Channel
Master argued that its communication and cooperatic.n with various
governmental agencies satisfied the requirement for public comment, but
a North Carolina district court rejected this contenticn." 6 The court
explained that no statutory language in CERCLA supports the contention
that working under the direction of state officials and obtaining necessary
state approvals constitutes consistency with the NCP."7 The court then
distinguished General Electric, noting that even i:F state agency
involvement satisfied the NCP consistency requirement, the State was
not sufficiently involved in Channel Master's remediation plan.' Most
importantly, the court posited an alternative interpretation to General
Electric's "extremely liberal construction" of CERCLA:
[T]he broad goals of the statute cannot be viewed in isolation, but
must instead be viewed in light of the condition precedent which
Congress imposed by its choice of statutory language .... [C]ourts
have recognized that adherence to the regulatory scheme outlined
in the NCP was deemed by Congress to be more important than
making CERCLA an unlimited vehicle for cleanup cost recovery." 9
Thus, because it failed to provide an opportunity for public
participation-independent of its cooperation with government
11I. Sherwin- Williams, 840 F. Supp. at 477.
112. 748 F. Supp. 373 (E.D.N.C. 1990).
113. Id. at 376.
114. Id at 378.
115. Id. at 380.
116. Id. at 390 ("[P]ublic input is most crucial to comply with the desire exp:-essed by Congress in
the CERCLA statute that the public have input in selecting the cleanup procedures for contaminated
sites in their neighborhoods.").
117. Id. at 392.
118. Id at 393 ("In the instant case there was no state involvement in the selection of cleanup
alternatives, no intensive state-private party negotiations, no Consent Decree mandating NCP
compliance, and no extensive compliance with the NCP which the state approved before and after
the response actions.").
119. Id.
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agencies--Channel Master did not satisfy the NCP consistency
requirement and could not recover its cleanup costs. 20
Other courts have found the Channel Master argument convincing. In
Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City ofHamtramck,2 for example, negotiations
with the Michigan Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) did not
satisfy the 1990 NCP community relations requirement." The court
declared that substituting state regulators for the public "is contrary to
the letter and the spirit of the regulations."' " Rather, the "regulations
clearly contemplate [public] participation... in decisions that could
affect the environmental conditions of their neighborhood."'24 The Sixth
Circuit affirmed the Sherwin-Williams rationale in another case involving
the MDNR, noting that even when a government agency itself develops a
cleanup plan, the NCP requires opportunities for public participation."z
Consequently, limited citizen involvement after the cleanup plan had
been developed was found insufficient.
26
VME Americas, Inc. v. Hein-Werner Corp.2" illustrates the outermost
boundary of a private party falling to recover its response costs for a
CERCLA-quality cleanup. VME discovered a potentially contaminated
site on its property, immediately reported the problem to the appropriate
authorities, investigated the extent of the contamination, and then
assumed responsibility for cleaning it up.' In addition, VME chose a
solution that was both cost-effective and environmentally sound.'29 VME
did not, however, provide the community with information about the
contamination, designate a spokesperson, solicit public comment on the
selection of the response action, or inform the community of actions
taken. 30 As a result, a Wisconsin district court held that VME could not
120. Id. at 394.
121. 840 F. Supp. 470 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
122. It at 477.
123. I
124. I The court highlighted the specifics of the public comment requirements as set forth in
40 C.F.tR § 300.430(f)(3), such as publishing a brief analysis of the proposed plan in a major
newspaper, allowing the submission of written and oral comments, and holding a public meeting
during the comment period. Ia
125. Pierson Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Pierson Township, 89 F.3d 835, No. 94-1472, 1996 WL
338624, at *5 (6th Cir. June 18, 1996).
126. Id. at *3-5.
127. 946 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Wis. 1996).
128. Id. at 692.
129. Id.
130. Id at 690.
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recover its response costs from the party most responsible for causing the
contamination.''
First, the VME court said that community relations requirement
applies equally to removal and remedial actions.' In a removal action,
the 1990 NCP community relations requirement compels a private party
to designate a spokesperson to inform immediately-affected citizens as
well as state and local officials. 33 VME made no effort to notify the
surrounding community, let alone immediately-affected citizens.
34
Second, the court reiterated the rationale articulated by Channel
Master-that the NCP is not a regulatory obstacle couse, but a set of
requirements to be adhered to if a private party wants to recover response
costs under CERCLA 35 Consequently, even though the record pointed
to the unfairness of a defendant escaping financial responsibility for
cleaning up contamination he or she likely created, "that is what the law
requires.... Congress and the bureaucracy deems [sic] public
involvement critical to recovery under CERCLA, and the Court is duty
bound to enforce their intentions in this regard."' 36 Thus, from the VME
perspective, a private party that conducts a successful cleanup cannot
recover its response costs unless it provides an opportunity for public
participation. 37
C. Policies Underlying Public Participation
Courts allowing recovery without public participation have admitted
to their liberal construction of CERCLA and the NCP public comment
provisions. They reason that government agencies, especially those
131. Id. at 692.
132. Id. at 690-91 ("The NCP expressly requires public comment in removal actions (40 C.F.R.
§ 300A15(n)), and then twice reiterates this requirement in connection with a cost recovery action
for removal costs (40 C.F.1 §§ 300.700(c)(5)(vi) & 300.700(c)(6)(ii)).") (citing Alcan-Toyo Am.,
Inc. v. Northern Ill. Gas Co., 904 F. Supp. 833, 836-37 (N.D. Il. 1995)).
133. Id at 690 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 300.415(n)(1)).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 693 (citing Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc. v. JFD Elecs. Corp., 748 F. Supp. 373,
394 (E.D.N.C. 1990)).
136. Id. at 692-93.
137. See also PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., No. 93 C 1379, 1997 WIL 223060 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 29, 1997). Like the plaintiff in VME, PMC conducted a cleanup that the court deemed a
necessary response to a human health and environment threat. Id. at *7. However, because PMC did
not notify nearby residential and business neighbors, prepare a community relations plan, or
schedule any public meetings, PMC could not recover its response costs. Id at '9-10.
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charged with protecting the environment, represent the public interest. 3 '
Three interrelated policy perspectives provide an understanding of why
courts would want to grant some leeway to a private party plaintiff.
First, courts place a high priority on encouraging private parties to
perform voluntary cleanups. They speak of not frustrating the goals of
CERCLA, which include protecting and preserving the public health.'3 9
Private parties usually can clean up more quickly and for less money
than the government."4 Therefore, creating a high threshold for proving
consistency with the NCP, such as strictly interpreting the community
relations requirement, could discourage private initiative and ultimately
lead to more pollution. By maintaining a broad construction of the
substantial compliance test and by permitting state agency involvement
to substitute for public comment, courts encourage future private party
response cost actions.
Second, some private parties may have limited experience in
performing cleanups under the NCP. Not all cleanups take place under
the direction of large corporate enterprises. One can imagine a property
owner who wants to construct a daycare facility, but who learns that
obtaining a permit is conditioned on complying with a state order to
clean up contamination created by the prior owner. Or a small business
owner who plans to redevelop a contaminated site. 4 ' Or a nonprofit
organization that needs to rebuild its tornado-damaged community
center, only to discover hazardous waste in the soil. For those with little
experience or understanding of environmental cleanup actions, tackling a
complex regulation such as the NCP can be daunting. And like the
plaintiff in Sherwin-Williams, these organizations may believe that
simply working with state agencies and obeying state laws will suffice.
So as to not penalize this practice, some courts have concluded that if a
private party works extensively with a government agency to accomplish
a CERCLA-quality cleanup, then the public interest is adequately
represented and consistency with the NCP is satisfied.
138. See, e.g., American Color & Chem. Corp. v. Tenneco Polymers, Inc., 918 F. Supp. 945,
956-57 (D.S.C. 1995); General Elec. Co. v. Litton Bus. Sys., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 949, 961 (W.D. Mo.
1989), aff'd sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F. 2d 1415 (8th
Cir. 1990).
139. See, e.g., American Color, 918 F. Supp. at 955 (citing cases); General Electric, 715 F. Supp.
at 961 (same).
140. See Hazardous Waste Enforcement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, 5035 (1985).
141. See Joel B. Eisen, "Brownfields of Dreams"?: Challenges and Limits of Voluntary Cleanup
Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 883, 899 (stating that developers perceive liability
under CERCLA as most serious barrier to developing contaminated property, outweighing all
benefits).
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A third rationale for allowing state involvement to substitute for
public comment is the generally unspoken belief that insisting on public
participation might allow the party responsible for the contamination to
escape liability. If one of CERCLA's goals is to make the polluter pay, 42
then a private party that cleaned up the contamination of another should
not be punished for an otherwise successful CERCLA-quality cleanup.
General Electric illustrates this perspective. Aware that the plaintiff's
response costs approached one million dollars and satisfied that the
plaintiff selected the most cost-effective, long-term remedy, the court
determined that state agency input satisfied the public participation
requirement.1
43
In contrast, those courts adhering to the "public comment means
public comment" rationale argue that CERCLA's goal of protecting
human health and the environment is better effectuated by citizen
involvement.1" Channel Master, for example, cautions against
construing consistency with the NCP too loosely. Although a liberal
construction of the NCP would serve as an incentive to encourage future
private party cleanups, that incentive is not without its costs:
"Unchaining private forces to begin digging up and moving hazardous
wastes... raise[s] concerns about the environmental consequences of
section 107(a)(4)(B)."'"4 Because the NCP relies "almost exclusively on
private judgments about complex and ambiguous environmental
standards," parties undertaking cleanups must comply with the NCP to
provide cohesiveness to response planning and actions. 4 6 Accordingly,
failing to provide an opportunity for public comment has been found to
constitute a material and substantial departure from the NCP. 47
Furthermore, the complexity of the NCP does not excuse a private
party from complying with the community relations requirement. Courts
142. See Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose
Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 199, 279
(1996).
143. General Electric, 715 F. Supp. at 963.
144. See, e.g., PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., No. 93 C 1379, 1997 WL 223060, at *8 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 29, 1997) (citing preamble to 1990 NCP, 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8795 (1990)); VME Americas,
Inc. v. Hein-Werner Corp., 946 F. Supp. 683, 691 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Pierson Sand & Gravel, Inc. v.
Pierson Township, 851 F. Supp. 850, 856 (W.D. Mich. 1994), aff'd, 89 F.3d 835, No. 94-1472, 1996
WL 338624 (6th Cir. June 18, 1996).
145. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc. v. JFD Elecs. Corp., 748 F. Supp 373, 394 (E.D.N.C.
1990) (quoting Jeffrey M. Gaba, Recovering Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs: The Private Cause of
Action Under CERCLA, 13 Ecology L.Q. 181,231-32 (1986)).
146. Id.
147. See Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Hamtramck, 840 F. Supp. 470,477 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
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emphasize that NCP consistency should not be "reducible to an inquiry
into whether the cleanup was cost-efficient or environmentally sound.' 48
Public participation should be part of the inquiry as well. The general
public can provide insight into the environmental conditions of its
community, as distinguished from state agencies that scrutinize
environmental cleanups from a regulatory perspective. 149  Equally
important, courts look to the EPA's interpretation of the community
relations requirement, in which the EPA finds meaningful public
participation to be one of the criteria of a CERCLA-quality cleanup. 150 In
this context, an omission based on lack of experience is unacceptable.
The VME decision illustrates this perspective; even the most responsible
of private parties-one that carried out a cost-effective, environmentally
sound cleanup-could not recover without involving the public.
51
Finally, although courts want to ensure that polluters pay, they also
want to ensure that parties undertaking cleanups do not attempt to thwart
the NCP public participation requirements.' By broadly construing the
NCP, courts may be faced with the difficult challenge of deciding
whether a private party was truly unaware of the public relations
provisions or whether the party simply decided not to comply with the
requirement to avoid costly delays in development.'53 Therefore, some
courts have decided that public participation is not an expendable
element of NCP consistency but a critical factor toward ensuring that a
cleanup is done right.
IV. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: A FUNDAMENTAL COMPONENT
OF A CERCLA-QUALITY CLEANUP
The split of judicial interpretations illustrates the continuing clash of
two fundamental principles in CERCLA cost recovery actions:
148. -ME, 946 F. Supp. at 692 (citing Channel Master, 748 F. Supp. at 384 (quoting Amland
Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784,796 (D.N.L 1989))).
149. Sherwin-Williams, 840 F. Supp. at 477.
150. See, e.g., County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1514 (10th Cir. 1991); Gussin
Enters. v. Rockola, No. 89 C 4742, 1993 WL 114643, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 1993).
151. VME, 946 F. Supp. at 692; see also PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., No. 93 C 1379,
1997 WL 223060, at *10 (N.D. Il1. Apr. 29, 1997).
152. See A.S.I., Inc. v. Sanders, No. 92-1209-PFK, 1996 WL 91626, at *4 (D. Kan. Feb. 9, 1996)
(finding that plaintiff's remedial activities thwarted one of NCP's fundamental purposes: including
public in proposed hazardous waste cleanups).
153. See, e.g., Metropolitan Serv. Dist. v. Oregon Metal Finishers, Inc., CIV No. 90-229-JU, 1990
WL 134537, at *3 (D. Or. Sept. 11, 1990) (holding that plaintiff did not comply with NCP because
plaintiffdid not provide opportunity for public comment in attempt to avoid construction delays).
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CERCLA-quality cleanups versus public participation. On one hand,
some courts grant private parties latitude in complying with the NCP by
accepting agency involvement as a substitute for public comment,
provided those parties attain a CERCLA-quality cleanup."s On the other
hand, other courts consider a lack of public participation, despite the
appearance of a successful CERCLA-quality cleanup, a bar to
recovery. 5' These interpretive differences continue to exist because of a
fundamental failure to understand the nature and impo.tance of public
participation. Once courts come to a more complete understanding of
what public participation is, they will realize that government
involvement alone is insufficient to demonstrate consistency with the
NCP.
A. What Is Public Participation?
Superficially, at least, most courts recognize that public participation
is important. Nevertheless, many judicial interpretations continue to de-
emphasize the importance of public participation in a successful cleanup
when determining NCP consistency. They do so because of a general
lack of understanding as to what "public participation," "community
relations," "meaningful public comment," and ever) other similar
statutorily- and judicially-created expression actually means. To resolve
this conflict, all courts must realize what public participation is and
whom it encompasses.
Public participation has its roots in democratic theory. Rousseau,
de Tocqueville, and Jefferson all have articulated their vision of a society
wherein citizens actively participate in decisions that affect them.'56 Mill
believed that participation at the local level also contributed to a
democratic society.'57 Modem theorists have explained that public
participation engenders civic competence by permitting individuals to
overcome feelings of powerlessness and alienation.5 8 Other democratic
154. See discussion supra Part IILA.
155. See discussion supra Part llI.B.
156. See Carol Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory 24-3C (1970) (discussing
Rousseau and de Tocqueville); Daniel Fiorino, Environmental Risk and Democratic Process: A
Critical Review, 14 Colum. . Envtl. L. 501, 507 (1989) (referring to EPA's "Jeffersonian faith" in
public's capacity to take part in decisions affecting them).
157. See Pateman, supra note 156, at 31.
158. See Fiorino, supra note 156, at 536 (summarizing philosophies of public participation
theorists B. Barber, . Mansbridge, and C. Pateman).
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values of legitimacy, education, and community empowerment may also
result from a process of inclusion. 59
The demand for public participation in decision making has remained
strong over the years. It continues to play a prominent role in a variety of
legislative enactments, including the Administrative Procedure Act,"6
Freedom of Information Act, 6' and Government in the Sunshine Act. 62
In the environmental arena, virtually every major environmental law
contains some form of public participation provision.63 Nevertheless,
although public participation is an ideal reflected in writings on
democracy and civic involvement as well as in legislative mandates, in
practice two major questions remain. Who is "the public"? And what is
"participation"?
In contrast to the perception that the public is a "monolithic,
unarticulated mass of people," no single public can be readily defined."6
The public is an amalgam of individuals and groups with diverse
interests and experiences. In the section 107 context, which involves a
private party cleaning up a site in a particular community, the public
might include environmental groups, neighborhood communities, small
businesses, local government, or a single interested citizen. The public's
reasons for wanting to become involved in the cleanup may reflect a
similar set of divergent-but localized-perspectives."65 These reasons
could include concern over increased health risks due to proximity to the
contaminated site, disruption of land use activities, or environmental
equity concerns.
159. Ellison Folk, Comment, Public Participation in the Superffund Cleanup Process, 18 Ecology
L.Q. 173, 179 (1991).
160. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556-557 (1994).
161. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
162. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
163. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 402(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1994) (stating that opportunity for
public hearing is required to issue discharge permit); Coastal Zone Management Act § 306(d),
42 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (1994) (approving state coastal zone management plans contingent on holding
public hearings); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 7004(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6974(b) (1994)
(requiring notice and hearing for permits); Clean Air Act § 110(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (1994)
(establishing that state implementation plans can be adopted only after reasonable notice and public
hearing).
164. Folk, supra note 159, at 191.
165. Ia ("Most sites affect only the local community; they fail to capture national attention, affect
national interests, or involve nationally organized interest groups.").
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Likewise, participation takes more than one form. 1" It is a process
commonly bounded by formal notions of notice, comment, and public
hearings, but also by informal activities such as creating citizen advisory
groups or interviewing community residents and other affected parties to
determine how and when citizens want to be involved.16 7 Of course,
participation also can occur in response to the lack of an opportunity to
be represented-in the form of protest, for example.1
68
It is the conglomeration of these forces-the social, economic,
physical, geographical, emotional, governmental, and institutional
interests of a particular community-that constitutes "meaningful public
participation." And whether community members actually succeed in
expressing these interests is contingent on whether they are provided
with the opportunity to do so. Most importantly, in a highly localized
process such as hazardous waste cleanup, that opportunity cannot rest
solely with government agency representation.
B. Government Involvement Is Not Enough
Although filled with good intentions, courts that accept state agency
involvement as a substitute for the public are doing a disservice to the
true meaning of "community relations." These courts are sacrificing
diversity of representation for a misplaced belief that a governmental
agency can reasonably represent all of the concerns of a particular
community. True public participation, however, allows for all interests to
be represented, especially where the quality of a community's health and
surrounding environment are at stake.169 Citizen involvement by those
who are closest to the environmental hazard enhances the quality of a
decision, which can only lead to a more effective result-one that can be
readily identified as a "CERCLA-quality" cleanup.
166. See Neil A. F. Popovic, The Right to Participate in Decisions that Afect the Environment,
10 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 683, 691 (1993) (defining effective participation to include education about
environment and things that affect it; access to information, such as knowing that it exists and is
available; voice in decision making; and transparency of decisional processes by formally
considering public input and explaining how that input affected decision at issue).
167.. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R.
§§ 300.415(n), .430(c), .430(f)(3) (1996).
168. See Fiorino, supra note 158, at 504 ("Citizens in a democratic society will eventually
interfere with decisions in which they do not feel represented.") (quoting B. Fischoff, Acceptable
Risk 148 (1981)).
169. Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative Risk Assessment,
1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 103, 129-130.
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Public participation, as embodied by the community relations
requirement, is especially significant in the environmental justice
context. Low-income communities and communities of color bear a
disproportionate share of health risks from being exposed to
environmental hazards.' ° At the same time, such communities often
possess limited knowledge and lack the resources necessary to influence
a cleanup decision, provided they have even been informed that a private
party cleanup is being considered. Like all communities, they have a
distinct interest in ensuring that a private party is responsive to their
localized concerns. After all, just as they have been affected by the
contamination, so too will they be affected by the type of cleanup action
taken.1
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Therefore, rather than have a cleanup plan "chosen" for a community,
the community relations provisions require that citizens directly affected
by a proposal be provided with an opportunity to be active participants in
the decision making process. 7 2 In turn, a sense of legitimacy and fairness
in the process will replace the alienation, frustration, and resentment
harbored by those who feel their concerns have been disregarded.'73
Critics of this inclusive concept of public participation have argued
that placing too strong an emphasis on the community relations
requirement creates additional costs and delays important decisions.'74
Furthermore, they question whether the lay public has the ability to make
170. 1 Environmental Equity Workgroup, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Environmental Equity.
Reducing Riskfor All Communities 3 (1992).
171. Eisen, supra note 141, at 1001-02 ("[l]f a cleanup fails, the community will have to
shoulder some or all of the additional cleanup osts ... [which thereby] lends added urgency to
making the first cleanup a thorough one.").
172. See Kuehn, supra note 169, at 160. Arguing that environmental justice is concerned with
process of decision making, Kuehn writes: "[Environmental justice] seeks to empower those persons
subjected to involuntary risks and to give them a major role in the process of assessing and managing
the risks in their communities." Id.
173. See Sheila Foster, Race(ial) Matters: The Questfor Environmental Justice, 20 Ecology L.Q.
721, 750 (1993) (arguing that decision making that includes public participation gains independent
legitimacy because the process possesses "the liberal virtues of broad participation, tolerance, and
intelligent deliberation') (quoting Daniel A. Farber, Review Essay, Environmentalism, Economics
and the Public Interest, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1021, 1042 (1989)); see also Folk, supra note 159, at 180
("By involving the communities in these decisions, people will understand the limits of the decisions
so they know the background. They know why the decision is made. They feel a part of the final
resolution. And they can make a contribution toward achieving the cleanup they can live with.")
(quoting Dioxin Cleanup: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the
House Comm. on Science and Technology, 99th Cong. 584 (1985) (statement of Lois Gibbs, Love
Canal resident)).
174. See James L. Creighton, The Public Involvement Manual 20 (1981); Fiorino, supra note 158,
at 523.
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informed decisions on technically complex issues.'"5 Even those who are
not critical of public participation, but who truly believe that government
involvement is sufficient, maintain this belief because they perceive that
experts who work on behalf of the public can best furfaer the public's
goals of effective hazardous waste cleanup.1
7 6
To the contrary, the long-term value of public participation in
hazardous waste cleanup outweighs any concerns over short-term delays
and costs. An absence of opportunities for participation may increase
public dissatisfaction, resulting in potential confrontation, litigation, and
unwanted future delays. The community relations provisions help
dissipate this potential outcome by ensuring an appropriate level of
community involvement. They have been carefully integrated into the
response process and represent the minimum level of participation that
the EPA has found through experience to be necessary. 77
Similarly, the technical complexities of a cleanup should not preclude
public involvement. Many individuals with no formal technical training,
but who are concerned about the quality of their drinking water or soil,
can educate themselves about a site that significantly affects themselves,
their families, or their neighbors.7 Moreover, public participation can
generate alternative-and perhaps even better-ideas about a cleanup
than the more technocratic process that occurs with government agency
oversight. Agency involvement, no matter how extensive, provides an
incomplete picture of all the elements necessary to make a sound
environmental decision. "There is a difference between the need to use
good technique and provide accurate information and the need to make
decisions which take into account people's values and perceptions."'179
An agency, regardless of how committed it is to the public interest,
cannot always consider these diverse values and perceptions held by non-
governmental interests. For example, the concept of risk is qualitatively
175. See Kuehn, supra note 169, at 130-31 (discussing highly specihdized nature of risk
assessment); Ann Bray, Comment, Scientific Decision Making: A Barrier to Citizen Participation in
Environmental Decision Making, 17 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 1111, 1115 (1991).
176. See American Color & Chem. Corp. v. Tenneco Polymers, Inc., 918 . Supp. 945, 956-57
(1995).
177. 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8766-67 (1990).
178. Folk, supra note 159, at 181. Lois Gibbs, for example, was a mother and housewife from
Love Canal who organized neighbors, insisted on more information about ha:ardous waste sites in
her community, and demanded a quick and equitable resolution to the problem. She now heads a
national organization, Citizens' Clearinghouse on Hazardous Wastes, which educates communities
about hazardous waste sites and cleanup. Id
179. Id at 186.
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(and often quantitatively) different for an agency expert than for a person
or community that is bearing that risk.' Likewise, an environmental
organization that is motivated more by aesthetic, biological, or
recreational concerns may possess an entirely different approach to a
cleanup than that of an adjacent community.'
Because hazardous waste cleanup is a highly localized process
involving a particular community and a relatively well-defined set of
players, a private party undertaking a cleanup should be especially aware
of its role in the community of which it is a part. Although it may not
have contributed to the contamination, that party must live with the
repercussions related to its cleanup. Such repercussions will undoubtedly
include whether it provided an opportunity for public participation and
how well it responded to the community's localized concerns. Yet in this
smaller context, participation should be easier to accomplish, and as a
result, be encouraged more than ever.'82
Finally, it is important to remember that the community relations
requirements represent the minimum level of involvement necessary to
ensure that public participation is taken seriously. Equally important is
that a private party can eliminate any risk or uncertainty the full set of
requirements.' If a community is not afforded this minimal opportunity
to be involved in decisions that affect its health and environment, then a
court should find that a private party has failed to demonstrate
consistency with the NCP. Anything less demonstrates a lack of
understanding of what meaningful public participation truly entails.
180. Id. at 188. Folk writes:
A public view of risk, while including rational notions of how many people per million can be
expected to contract cancer, is more complex. Risk includes consideration of how one dies, the
fear that one may die, how many people will die at one time, how concentrated the location of
the deaths will be, the amount of control one has over the potential outcome, who makes the
decisions, and who bears the risk.
l See generally Kuehn, supra note 169.
181. Adam N. Brain, Comment, Public Participation Provisions Need Not Contribute to
Environmental Injustice, 5 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 145, 155-56 (1996) (noting that
environmental groups tend to focus on enforcement to bring violators in compliance with law, while
affected community may perceive imposing fines or installing cleaner technology as insufficient
remedy to past exposure to toxins and continued fear of future illness).
182. See Folk, supra note 159, at 191 (noting that because of localized nature of site, "the cleanup
process [is] more amenable to participation and the values participation fosters").
183. 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8794 (1990).
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V. CONCLUSION
The National Contingency Plan states that private parties undertaking
response actions should provide an opportunity for public comment.' In
the alternative, the opportunity for public comment can be based on
substantially equivalent state and local requirements. 185 Nowhere,
however, does the NCP state that government agency involvement can
substitute for public participation. Nor should it. Regardless of how
committed an agency is to the public interest, it caraot sufficiently
represent the multifarious interests embodied by a particular community.
Courts should heed the NCP community relations requirement with an
eye toward encouraging proactive community involvement throughout
the cleanup process. Providing an opportunity for memingful public
participation is critical to a successful cleanup. It facilitates
communication between private parties and affected citizens, which
results in more informed decision making, and ultimately the
achievement of a more effective solution for all. Thus, courts should not
pit public participation against a cleanup that appears to be cost-effective
or environmentally sound. Instead, they should recognize that public
participation is a fundamental component of a truly CERCLA-quality
cleanup.
184. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.700(c)(6) (1996).
185. 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(6).
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